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Abstract
    Fraud is an important operational risk faced by insurance companies. Furthermore, operational risk has attracted much attention and has been managed by financial institutions since Basel Ⅱ. In banking, the agency problem arising from a loan is one kind of operational risk. In an insurance company, fraud arising from the behavior of the insured who is covered by the insurance contract is also an operational fraud that is similar to that occurring in banking. Maintaining long-term relationships with customers is one possible way of managing the agency problem arising from loans in banking. In this paper, we investigate the possibility that maintaining a long-term relationship with the insured can mitigate the problem of fraud for the insurance company. We find evidence suggesting that the long-term customers of the insurance company are less likely to commit fraud when fraud is prevalent. Hence, maintaining a long-term relationship is also an important resource for the insurance company as it seeks to manage operational risk.


Introduction
    Fraud is a serious problem faced by almost all insurance companies around the world.​[1]​ Furthermore, external fraud is an important form of operational risk affecting the insurance company.​[2]​ While operational risk has attracted much attention and has been managed by banks since Basel Ⅱ, insurance companies should also confront such operational risk and manage it by learning from the experiences of banks. Maintaining long-term relationships with customers is one possible strategy.
    Many studies in the literature, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Peterson and Rajan (1994) have mentioned that banks are confronted by an agency problem which arises from their loan customers in cases where the borrower may abuse the funds borrowed after the loan is permitted by the bank. Even when the loan is based on a profitable project, such an agency problem could still arise and result in the borrower defaulting on the loan. This is one type of operational risk that a bank faces.​[3]​ Many banks that confront this external operational risk tend to adopt credit rationing. This, in turn, causes the market to become inefficient.
    The fraud problem which arises in the insurance market is also similar to this agency problem resulting from loans in the credit market. In such instances, the insured could benefit from some manipulation with regard to claims made after the insurance contract has been signed. This external operational risk could also cause the insurance company to lose money, incur unnecessary costs of auditing, and result in inefficiency.
Many studies on banking in the literature have further investigated this kind of external operational risk from the point of view of asymmetric information, and have pointed out that the long-term bank-borrower relationship could mitigate this external operational risk. Peterson and Rajan (1994) indicated that such a relationship can reduce this problem of asymmetric information. Banks can learn about their customers’ characteristics over time. Hence, studies on banking advocate that building an ongoing relationship through explicit multi-period contracts or implicit commitments can resolve the problem of inefficiency brought about by information asymmetry.​[4]​
On the other hand, Sharpe (1990) mentioned that good customers also tend to have close ties with their banks because they are also confronted with the problem of conveying their superior information to new banks in such an environment with adverse selection. Hence, in equilibrium, the asymmetric information problems can be mitigated by the long-term relationships between banks and their customers.
 There are many empirical studies that have supported the above inferences. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 1991) proved using data for Japan data that the firms which had close ties with banks were less likely to be liquidity constrained. Berger and Udell (1992) found that borrowers that had longstanding relationships with lenders were less likely to be required to provide collateral for their loans. Schenone (2010) also found that the asymmetric information regarding loan customers between loan-lenders and other non-loan lenders grew as the banking relationship deepened.
Although, many studies in banking have highlighted the importance of a long-term bank-borrower relationship when banks are confronted with external operational risk as they extend loans, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no one has so far considered this problem in insurance. This paper is thus the first to point out that a long-term insurer-insured relationship could help to mitigate the external operational risk that arises because of fraud.
The customers who are willing to maintain a relationship with a single insurance company are the long-term customers of that insurance company. An insurance company can know its long-term customers better than other new customers with the passing of time. The information revealed through this long-term relationship contains many behaviors of the insured including their claim behavior. The transparency of information on long-term customers can help the insurance company to manage fraudulent risk within this group of long-term customers.
Furthermore, individuals’ attitudes toward insurance fraud should depend on their attitudes toward the insurance companies. Bourgeon and Picard (2012) mentioned that individuals tend to neutralize the psychological cost of their improper behavior with their counterpart’s unfair behavior. Hence, fraud could in the mind of the insured be treated as an “eye for eye” form of behavior in regard to the insurance company for those insured who have a bad impression of the insurance company. Tennyson (1997, 2002) also found that the insured who have a better attitude toward the insurance company are less likely to commit fraud. Generally speaking, the customers with a long-term relationship with a single insurance company are often loyal customers. Their willingness to have this long-term relationship with a single insurance company is often due to their better impression of this one insurance company. Hence, from this point of view, the probability of fraud should also be lower among these long-term insured compared with other insured.
This paper use Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance data to test whether the long-term customers of the insurance company are less likely to defraud. Our research sample includes contracts sold during the years 2007 and 2008. The insured’s contract history with the insurance company for the contract in each year is traced for the previous seven years.​[5]​ Two previous studies have investigated the fraud phenomenon in Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance market.​[6]​ This paper revisits these three types of contract, and finds that the phenomenon of fraud is less prevalent among long-term customers than among other customers.
External operational risk has become a hot issue in the literature on banking. We contribute to the literature by stating that it should also be an important issue for the insurance company, and could be resolved by a possible strategy to build a long-term relationship with customers. We also contribute to the insurance companies by raising two points. First, maintaining a long-term customer relationship could help reduce fraud. Second, the insurer’s audit efficiency could be improved by using the relationship history of the insured as a source of reference.
 This paper is organized as follows. This first section introduces the issue, as well as the important findings and contribution of this paper. The second section interprets our research data. The third section introduces our empirical methodology and presents the empirical results. The fourth section is the conclusion.


Data
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the insured who have a long history of contact with the insurance company, whom we can refer to as long-term customers, are less likely to commit fraud than other insured. By focusing on the automobile theft insurance contact, we test three kinds of contract for evidence of fraud and their counterpart contracts. The first is the contract with a replacement cost endorsement, and the contract with a deductible and with depreciation is its counterpart contract. The second is the no deductible contract, and its counterpart is also the contract with a deductible and depreciation.​[7]​ The third is the theft insurance contract without typhoon and flood damage coverage, and a contract which is further extended to typhoon and flood damage coverage is its counterpart.
Based on the year 2007 and year 2008 contracts, we trace the contact history of these insured with this target insurance company over the previous seven years. Hence, for the year 2007 contracts, the contact history is traced all the way to the year 2000, and for the year 2008 contracts, the contact history is traced all the way to the year 2001. Furthermore, although we focus on the automobile theft insurance contract, the contact history between the insured and the insurance company is not restricted to contact through a theft insurance contract. All of the contact through any kind of automobile insurance contract, including compulsory/voluntary third party liability insurance and physical damage insurance, can also provide a chance for the insurance company to build a relationship with its customer.
 Table 1 lists the customers’ structure in terms of their history of contact with the insurance company for the pooled data for the years 2007 and 2008. The percentage of entirely new customers is only 6.2%, with the other 93.8% of the insured already having at least one year of contact history with this insurance company. The first column shows the total contact history before the current year, regardless of whether there is a gap in the contact history or not, whereas the second column shows the history of continuous contact before the current year. We find that over half (51.09%) of the insured have more than five years of contact history when we consider the total number of years of contact. While we wish to know how many years of unbroken contact history there are, 46.5% of the insured are found to have more than five years of continuous contact history. We define those insured who have more than five years of continuous contact history as the long-term customers.​[8]​
By constructing one index which represents a sufficient amount of information on the insured that the insurance company can collect, we can define a long-term customer based on the number of years of continuous contact. Furthermore, we can only infer a maximum contact history of seven years in our research sample. However, from the point of view of the insured’s willingness to maintain a relationship with the insurance company, this criterion is unfair for those young drivers who are under 25 years old. The insured who are under the age of 25 have no chance of establishing a relationship with the insurance company of up to seven years even if they so desire. Hence, in considering this, we calculate the structure of customers again in Table 1A by removing young insured under the age of 25 from the sample. 
From Table 1A, we find that there are only minor changes. Furthermore, the percentage of the insured who have more than five years of unbroken or accumulated contact with the insurance company has not changed. We can thus infer that taking into consideration the insured’s willingness to be a loyal customer does not have an explicit effect on our analysis.​[9]​ Hence, whenever we investigate the behavior of the long-term customers in this research, we maintain our definition of a long-term customer as being one in which the young insured are included.
Table 2 provides a description of the variables used in this research. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the overall research sample, for the subsample of long-term customers, and for the counterpart (the subsample of short-term customers who have less than five years of contact history with our target insurance company).
In our research sample, the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles are consistent with the general structure in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. The insured are mostly concentrated among middle-aged married females.​[10]​ Nearly 60% of the insured vehicles are not over 5 years old. Most of the insured vehicles are small and medium-sized vehicles. The engine capacity of 59.94% of the insured vehicles does not exceed 2000 c.c., while that of 33.51% of the insured vehicles is between 2000 c.c. and 3000 c.c.. The market share of the most popular vehicle brand is over 40%, while the next three most popular brands are uniformly distributed among the other insured. Furthermore, the car dealer-owned agents (channel_D) account for the largest market channel. Their market share is almost 40%.
Of the overall sample, 41.23% of the insured are long-term customers according to our definition. We also separately list the characteristics of these insured and their counterparts within Table 3.
The first observation regarding the difference between long-term customers and their counterparts is that there is a lower percentage of females insured in the long-term customers group. In fact, this does not imply that long-term customers are made up mostly of males. It rather implies that there are more persons who reveal the truth in the long-term customers group. In Taiwan, due to the premium rate being lower for females, some male drivers would use the name of their female family members to register their vehicles. Hence, the male vehicle owners are mostly the real vehicle drivers, and they also truthfully reveal their identity when purchasing insurance.
The second observation is that there are lower percentages of vehicles which are registered in the cities and the northern area of Taiwan. This phenomenon may reveal the fact that the insurance market is more competitive, and that the customers face more choices in the cities and northern part of Taiwan. 
The third observation is that the distribution channels could also affect the contact history of the customers. In particular, the car dealer-owned agency channel (channel_D), the finance house channel (channel_L), as well as the financial institution channel (channel_F) provide fewer long-term customers to the insurance company. The customers mostly come from the transport service company channel (channel_T), and the customers who deal directly with the insurance company (the counterpart of these channel variables) tend to maintain longer-term relationships with the insurance company. This observation is consistent with the inferences from the literature on insurance marketing.
Besides, the long-term insured in terms of their structure are older and their vehicles are older, too, which coincides with a natural tendency. We also find that differences in preferences for certain vehicle brands could also be related to differences in the tendency to form a long-term relationship with the insurance company.
With these data, we investigate the fraud phenomenon in Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance market. We also try to find out that whether the long-term customers are less likely to commit fraud in this market.


Methodology and empirical results
We focus on the three types of fraud based on the theft events in relation to Taiwan’s automobile insurance contracts. The first one refers to the fraud induced by the replacement cost endorsement contract of automobile theft insurance. The second one is the fraud induced by the no deductible endorsement contract of automobile theft insurance. Dionne and Wang (2012) find that the automobile theft insurance contract with a replacement cost endorsement tends to have a higher rate of total theft claims, especially given that this higher rate of total theft claims only emerges near the end of the policy year. They also find that the automobile theft insurance contract with no deductible endorsement also tends to have a higher rate of total theft claims, but this higher rate of total theft claims only emerges at the beginning of the policy year. Meanwhile, these particular time patterns of the correlation between coverage and claim do not exist when the claim is identified by partial theft. Hence, Dionne and Wang (2012) claim that the evidence points to fraud instead of adverse selection and/or ex ante moral hazard.
The third type of fraud is the opportunistic fraud induced by the automobile theft insurance contract when the contract is not further extended to include coverage for typhoon/flood insurance. Pao, Tzeng and Wang (2012) find that the insured who have purchased automobile theft insurance but have not purchased typhoon/flood insurance have a higher total theft claim rate right after a huge typhoon. This particular time pattern is especially noticeable within a typhoon-affected region, and does not emerge when the claim is identified by partial theft. Accordingly, there is evidence of opportunistic fraud instead of advantageous selection and/or ex ante moral hazard.
This paper tests the fraud phenomena induced by these three types of contracts again. The research period includes the year 2007 and the year 2008. We focus on a comparison of the tendency to engage in fraudulent behaviour between long-term customers and their counterparts.
The empirical methodology we adopt to test the fraud induced by the replacement cost endorsement contract and the no deductible endorsement contract involves the use of the two-stage method. We use this two-stage method to separately evaluate the conditional correlation between coverage and claims for different twelve policy months. In the first stage, we run a Probit regression for the claim probability:
, ,    (1)
where  and  () indicates that there is a total (partial) theft claim filed in the t-th month, otherwise .  is the vector which includes the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles, and these are listed in Table 2.  is the vector which includes the corresponding coefficients for all explanatory variables in this regression.
    In the second stage, we run the probability of choosing the replacement cost endorsement contract.  when the insured has purchased the replacement cost endorsement contract, otherwise . The explanatory variables include the vector of characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles (). The estimated claim probability () from the first stage, and the claim dummy variable () are included among the explanatory variables. 
     (2)
When there is a significantly positive correlation between the replacement cost endorsement contract and the claim, the estimated coefficient () should be positive and significantly different from 0. 
According to the prediction of fraud, when we test for the contract with a replacement cost endorsement, the significantly positive conditional correlation should only exist in the policy months near the end of the policy year. When we test for the contract with no deductible endorsement, the significantly positive correlation should only exist in several months near the beginning of the policy year. These time patterns should only exist when the claim is identified by total theft instead of partial theft. In other words, there should only be s when  and  is near the end of the policy year when the contract includes a replacement endorsement, and  is among the policy months in the early part of the year when the contract has no deductible endorsement. Hence, we still need to perform the above two-stage test when the claim is identified by partial theft. If the above time patterns exist when , but these time pattern do not exist when , the evidence points to fraud instead of ex ante moral hazard.
When we compare the tendency to engage in fraud between long-term customers and the other customers, we include one more interaction term () in the second stage:
 (2’)
where  indicates that the insured is a long-term customer, in other words, the insured has a history of at least five years of continuous contact with the insurance company; otherwise, . According to our prediction that long-term customers may be less likely to commit fraud, the above-mentioned time patterns should be less significant among the long-term customers. Hence, when , some s are positive and are significantly different from 0, which matches the above patterns. The corresponding s should be negative and significantly different from 0. However, such evidence is not expected to exist when the claim is identified by partial theft ().
    The second aspect of fraud that we investigate is induced by the theft insurance without the coverage of typhoon/flood insurance. The methodology also involves the two-stage method. We separately test the pattern of fraudulent behavior in relation to four huge typhoons that took place from January 2007 to December 2009.​[11]​ The pattern of fraud observed is that where the insured are with automobile theft insurance but without typhoon/flood insurance coverage, within the typhoon-affected region the total theft rate is higher right after the typhoons hit.​[12]​ Hence, the conditional correlation between the total theft claim and the theft insurance contract without the coverage of typhoon/flood insurance is only positive and significantly different from 0 within the typhoon-affected region, right after a typhoon hit, but that significant positive conditional correlation is not found to exist before a typhoon hit, or within the region not affected by the typhoons, or where the claim is identified by partial theft.
    The first stage of this conditional correlation test is:
            (3)
where  means there is a total theft (partial) claim filed when (); otherwise .
We still include the estimated claim probability (), the claim dummy variable (), and the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles () among the explanatory variables of the second-stage regression:
 (4)
In regression (4),  means that the claim is made within one month after the typhoon hit; otherwise.  means that the insured who has filed a claim was within the typhoon-affected region at this time the typhoon hit; otherwise . There are three interaction terms:  indicates that there is a claim filed and that the claim was filed within one month after the typhoon hit, otherwise it equals 0;  indicates that there was a claim filed and that the claim was filed within the region affected by the typhoon, otherwise it equals 0.  indicates that there was a claim filed and the claim was filed within one month after the typhoon hit and also within the typhoon-affected region, otherwise it equals 0. According to the predictions regarding the pattern of fraud, the estimated coefficient of  () should be positive and significantly different from 0 when the claim is identified by total theft (). However, we do not need this pattern when the claim is identified by partial theft ().
    The main purpose in this research is to test that whether the long-term customers are less likely to be characterized by the above fraud pattern. Hence, we further add an interaction term in the second stage:
                                                                (4’)
This interaction term  means that the insured is a long-term customer who is within the typhoon-affected region, and that he/she filed the claim within one month after the typhoon hit. According to our prediction, the long-term customer is less likely to commit fraud, and the estimated coefficient of this term () should be negative and significantly different from 0 when . By contrast, when the claim is identified by partial theft and the pattern does not exist, this prediction is not sustained, either.
Table 5 displays the empirical results of the conditional correlation between coverage and the total theft claim for the replacement cost endorsement contract and for the no deductible endorsement contract. Table 6 also displays the empirical results of these conditional correlations, the only difference being that the claims are identified by partial theft.
From Table 5, we can see that, the estimated coefficients of  from regression (2) are positive and significantly different from 0 from the 10th to the 12th policy months, which means there are significantly positive conditional correlations between the coverage and the total theft claim during last three policy months. The above patterns still exist in the results from regression (2’). Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of  are also negative and significantly different from 0 during those three policy months when we identify claims based on total theft (when  and 10, 11, 12). They imply that the long-term customers are significantly less likely to be characterized by this time pattern. Meanwhile, in Table 6, the above-mentioned time patterns of significantly positive conditional correlation are shown not to exist. In addition, the estimated coefficients of  are not significantly different from 0, either. Hence, by putting all the above empirical results together, we can conclude that there is evidence of fraud instead of adverse selection and/or ex ante moral hazard induced by the contract with the replacement cost endorsement. Furthermore, the long-term customers are less likely to commit fraud.
We can also find similar observations for the contract with no deductible endorsement from Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, from regression (2), the estimated coefficients  in the first two policy months are positive and significantly different from 0. In regression (2’), the above results remain, and the estimated coefficients  are negative and significantly different from 0 in the first two policy months when we identify the claim based on total theft (when  and 1, 2). This means that there are significantly positive conditional correlations between coverage and total theft claims in the first two policy months. However, for long-term customers, this time pattern is significantly lacking. Meanwhile, in Table 6, when claims are identified by partial theft, all of the estimated coefficients of  and  are insignificantly different from 0 during the first two policy months. These empirical results support the existence of fraud which is induced by the contract with no deductible endorsement. Meanwhile, there is less of a fraud phenomenon among long-term customers.
Tables 7 and 8 separately report the empirical results of regression (4’) for the four typhoon periods that took place during 2007 and 2008. Table 7 refers to the conditional correlation between the total theft claim and the theft insurance contract without typhoon/flood coverage. Table 8 refers to the conditional correlation between the partial theft claim and the theft insurance contract without the typhoon/flood coverage. 
The empirical results in Table 7 show that, for all four typhoon periods, all of the estimated coefficients  are positive and significantly different from 0. They imply that the insured who are within the typhoon-affected region have higher total theft claim rates within one month right after the typhoon hit. However, in Table 8, we find that, for these four typhoon periods, all of the estimated coefficients  are insignificantly different from 0. These results imply that this pattern only exists when the claim is identified by total theft instead of partial theft. Hence, this is evidence of fraud instead of evidence of advantageous selection and/or ex ante moral hazard. Furthermore, the fraud is induced by the theft insurance contract when the insured have not additionally purchased typhoon/flood insurance.
When we further observe the estimated coefficients  in Table 7, we can see that all the coefficients are negative and significantly different from 0. However, in Table 8, these coefficients are not significantly different from 0. These results imply that the long-term customers are less likely to commit fraud when fraud is found to exist. Furthermore, this evidence once again supports our inference regarding the tendency of the long-term customers to engage in fraudulent behavior based on a third contract in which the theft insurance contract does not extend to typhoon/flood coverage.
Through the fraud induced by these three different kinds of contracts, we arrive at a consistent conclusion that the long-term customers in an insurance company have fewer tendencies to commit fraud. The first reason could be because the insurance company is able to have more and better information about the long-term customers through their long-term relationship with the company. Hence, the asymmetric information related to the insured’s behavior after the insurance contracts have been signed will be mitigated.
Another possible reason could be that the insured who give a positive evaluation of their insurance company are less likely to self-justify fraudulent behavior. The willingness to have a fixed long-term relationship with these long-term customers is one objective index whereby the insured give the insurance company a positive evaluation. Furthermore, this reason also sustains the observation from the empirical evidence that significantly less fraudulent behavior exists among the long-term customers.


Conclusion
    The literature on banking has long been concerned with the problem of operational risk in financial institutions. The agency problem that arises due to loan customers is one important form of operational risk. Based on studies that have sought to deal with this problem, one of the important concepts that have been provided is that banks can mitigate some of this operational risk through maintaining long-term relationships with their loan customers.
    External fraud is also one important operational risk for the insurance company. Fraud for the insurance company is similar to the above agency problem for banks. However, no studies have investigated the problem of fraud for insurance companies from this point of view. What has also not been mentioned is the effect in terms of building a long-term relationship with their customers.
    This paper contributes to the literature in that we highlight the problem of external fraud being one important form of operational risk for insurance companies, and this operational risk can be managed through banks maintaining long-term relationships with their customers.
We predict and find evidence that the long-term customers of the insurance company are less likely to commit fraud. We investigate three kinds of insurance contracts that have already been proved in the literature to be able to induce fraud. This research further provides evidence that the long-term customers, who have a history of at least five years of continuous contact with the same insurance company, are less inclined to engage in fraudulent behavior when fraud is found to exist in the market.
Our finding not only contributes to the literature, but is also meaningful from a practical point of view. Insurance companies often audit insurance claims to detect or deter fraud. However, the downside of this strategy is not only that there is a significant out-of-pocket cost, but also that the insurance company has a reputation of being a bad payer and nitpicking when it comes to payment.​[13]​ If the insurance companies can have some information regarding which of the insured are trustworthy and which give rise to doubt, this information will help the insurance company to perform more efficient audits and execute quicker payments for normal claims. This can not only save on audit costs for the insurance companies, but can also help them put their bad reputation of being nitpicking to one side. We provide a valuable suggestion in that the long-term customers in the insurance company can be more trustworthy customers. They are less likely to commit fraud even when fraudulent behavior is prevalent.
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Table 1  Customer structure in automobile theft insurance for year 2007 and year 2008 contracts:
Customer structure:
Old	93.8
New	6.2
Old customer history:
	Total contact years	Continuous contact years
One	12.35	16.94
Two 	12.97	14.71
Three	12.34	12.28
Four	11.24	9.56
Five	10.77	7.94
Six	15.39	12.14
Seven	24.93	26.42

Table 1A  Customer structure in automobile theft insurance for year 2007 and year 2008 contracts (excluding insured under 25 years old):
Customer structure:
Old	93.99
New	6.01
Old customer history:
	Total contact years	Cumulative contact years
One	12.17	16.75
Two 	12.89	14.67
Three	12.32	12.28
Four	11.26	9.58
Five	10.82	7.97
Six	15.47	12.2
Seven	25.07	26.55
Note: 1.77% of observations are dropped.


Table 2  Variable definitions
Variable 	Definition
long	
sexf	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is female, otherwise it equals 0.
married	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is married, otherwise it equals 0.
age2025	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 20 and 25, otherwise it equals 0.
age2530	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 25 and 30, otherwise it equals 0.
age3060	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 30 and 60, otherwise it equals 0.
age6070	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 60 and 70, otherwise it equals 0.
ageabv70	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is over the age of 70, otherwise it equals 0.
carage0	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is brand new, otherwise it equals 0.
carage1	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is one year old, otherwise it equals 0.
carage2	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is two years old, otherwise it equals 0.
carage3	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is three years old, otherwise it equals 0.
carage4	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is four years old, otherwise it equals 0.
city	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in a city, otherwise it equals 0.
north	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, otherwise it equals 0.
south	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, otherwise it equals 0.
east	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in central Taiwan, otherwise it equals 0.
tramak_q	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is brand q, q= f, h, t, c, and 0 otherwise (other brands).
sedan	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or for long-term rental purposes, otherwise it equals 0.
vehcc_s	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured car equals or is under 1800 c.c., otherwise it equals 0.
vehcc_m	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured car is over 1800 c.c. and equals or is under 2000 c.c., otherwise it equals 0.
channel_m	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the policy is sold through the m channel, m=D, R, T, L, F, A, and 0 otherwise (directly from the insurance company).
y_2007	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insurance contract is signed in the year 2007, otherwise it equals 0.


Table 3   Descriptive statistics
	Whole sample	Loyal customers	Non-loyal customers
	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.	Mean	Std.
long	0.4123	0.4922				
sexf	0.6450	0.4785	0.6173	0.4860	0.6644	0.4722
married	0.8998	0.3002	0.9298	0.2555	0.8788	0.3264
age2025	0.0047	0.0684	0.0002	0.0141	0.0079	0.0883
age2530	0.0334	0.1796	0.0073	0.0853	0.0516	0.2212
age3060	0.8943	0.3075	0.9094	0.2870	0.8837	0.3206
age6070	0.0588	0.2352	0.0746	0.2628	0.0477	0.2131
ageabv70	0.0082	0.0902	0.0085	0.0916	0.0080	0.0892
carage0	0.0827	0.2755	0.0340	0.1813	0.1169	0.3213
carage1	0.1221	0.3273	0.0572	0.2322	0.1676	0.3735
carage2	0.1338	0.3404	0.0719	0.2583	0.1772	0.3818
carage3	0.1347	0.3414	0.0822	0.2747	0.1715	0.3770
carage4	0.1129	0.3165	0.0809	0.2727	0.1354	0.3421
city	0.5339	0.4988	0.5293	0.4991	0.5372	0.4986
north	0.4728	0.4993	0.4561	0.4981	0.4845	0.4998
south	0.2892	0.4534	0.2863	0.4520	0.2912	0.4543
east	0.0232	0.1507	0.0263	0.1599	0.0211	0.1438
tramak_f	0.0873	0.2822	0.0934	0.2910	0.0829	0.2757
tramak_h	0.0802	0.2716	0.0760	0.2650	0.0831	0.2760
tramak_t	0.4174	0.4931	0.3874	0.4872	0.4384	0.4962
tramak_c	0.0722	0.2588	0.0872	0.2821	0.0617	0.2405
sedan	0.9074	0.2899	0.9191	0.2727	0.8992	0.3011
vehcc_s	0.5994	0.4900	0.5992	0.4901	0.5996	0.4900
vehcc_m	0.3351	0.4720	0.3354	0.4721	0.3349	0.4720
channel_D	0.4031	0.4905	0.2544	0.4355	0.5074	0.4999
channel_R	0.0006	0.0235	0.0005	0.0213	0.0006	0.0249
channel_T	0.0032	0.0564	0.0042	0.0644	0.0025	0.0500
channel_L	0.0231	0.1503	0.0176	0.1314	0.0270	0.1621
channel_F	0.0202	0.1408	0.0177	0.1318	0.0220	0.1467
channel_A	0.0296	0.1695	0.0290	0.1678	0.0300	0.1707
y_2007	0.5049	0.5000	0.4948	0.5000	0.5120	0.4999



Table 4  Four huge typhoons from January 2007 to December 2008

Typhoon	Hit date	Hit region	Period right after typhoon	Period before typhoon
Typhoon 1	10.11.2007	North & East	10.11.2007~11.10.2007	07.24.2007~08.23.2007
Typhoon 2	07.29.2008	South	07.29.2008~08.28.2008	06.29.2008~07.28.2008
Typhoon 3	08.01.2008	South	08.01.2008~08.31.2008	06.29.2008~07.28.2008
Typhoon 4	09.19.2008	South	09.19.2008~10.18.2008	06.29.2008~07.28.2008



Table 5   Conditional correlation between replacement cost endorsement contract and total theft claim for the twelve policy months—the estimated coefficients from regressions (2) and (2’)
	Replacement cost contract	No deductible contract
	regression (2)	regression (2’)	regression (2)	regression (2’)
						
1st policy month (j=1)	0.0972(0.5346)	0.1043(0.5371)	-0.0483(0.9143)	0.7058(0.0231)	0.7563(0.0190)	-4.5809(0.0436)
2nd policy month (j=2)	-0.0450(0.7751)	-0.1937(0.2712)	0.9418(0.0381)	0.8973(0.0229)	0.9207(0.0087)	-4.4318(0.0501)
3rd policy month (j=3)	0.1507(0.4142)	0.1673(0.4210)	-0.0392(0.8726)	0.7823(0.1305)	0.7838(0.1303)	-1.6225(0.9921)
4th policy month (j=4)	-0.0598(0.7312)	0.0651(0.7539)	-0.4065(0.2971)	0.0380(0.9463)	0.0498(0.9305)	-1.3884(0.9667)
5th policy month (j=5)	-0.1746(0.4220)	-0.1513(0.4932)	0.9168(0.0513)	0.2530(0.5696)	0.3000(0.5137)	-1.7998(0.9204)
6th policy month (j=6)	0.2853(0.1302)	0.2731(0.1445)	-0.6533(0.1912)	-6.7196(0.8726)	-0.3612(0.4472)	1.8487(0.9276)
7th policy month (j=7)	0.1743(0.2708)	0.3223(0.0602)	-1.2725(0.0301)	0.0099(0.9892)	0.0583(0.9396)	-1.9315(0.9643)
8th policy month (j=8)	0.0493(0.8273)	0.0514(0.7452)	-0.5333(0.2420)	0.4848(0.2028)	0.4888(0.2013)	-1.6868(0.9833)
9th policy month (j=9)	0.0471(0.7804)	0.0402(0.7909)	0.0673(0.8171)	-3.4520(0.9241)	-3.4864(0.9280)	1.4209(0.9929)
10th policy month (j=10)	0.2497(0.0825)	0.2312(0.1035)	-1.3019(0.0400)	-0.1829(0.7002)	-0.1827(0.7007)	1.4409(0.9905)
11th policy month (j=11)	0.6934(0.0029)	0.7846(0.0044)	-1.3101(0.0354)	-2.0607(0.9300)	-2.0419(0.9281)	1.1075(0.9978)
12th policy month (j=12)	0.5601(0.0066)	0.5818(0.0013)	-1.4193(0.0173)	0.2080(0.7111)	0.4220(0.5104)	-2.5921(0.6466)



Table 6   Conditional correlation between replacement cost endorsement contract and partial theft claim for the twelve policy months—the estimated coefficients from regressions (2) and (2’)
	Replacement cost contract	No deductible contract
	regression (2)	regression (2’)	regression (2)	regression (2’)
						
1st policy month (j=1)	0.0578(0.9165)	0.0762(0.8917)	-1.8069(0.9737)	0.0578(0.9165)	0.0762(0.8917)	-1.8069(0.9737)
2nd policy month (j=2)	0.2133(0.6336)	0.2473(0.5900)	-2.2062(0.9685)	0.2133(0.6336)	0.2473(0.5900)	-2.2062(0.9685)
3rd policy month (j=3)	0.9307(0.0012)	1.0167(0.0008)	-2.9954(0.9333)	0.9307(0.0012)	1.0167(0.0008)	-2.9954(0.9333)
4th policy month (j=4)	0.9747(0.0118)	1.0023(0.0010)	-1.7621(0.9876)	0.9747(0.0118)	1.0232(0.0031)	-2.0346(0.9571)
5th policy month (j=5)	-0.5065(0.3470)	-0.5646(0.4520)	1.8801(0.5267)	-0.5065(0.3470)	-0.5646(0.6999)	0.8801(0.9998)
6th policy month (j=6)	0.8533(0.0944)	0.8549(0.0943)	-1.5805(0.9911)	0.8533(0.0944)	0.8549(0.0943)	-1.5805(0.9911)
7th policy month (j=7)	-0.2961(0.7806)	-0.2602(0.8134)	-1.8252(0.9812)	-0.2961(0.7806)	-0.2602(0.8134)	-1.8252(0.9812)
8th policy month (j=8)	0.6188(0.9998)	0.6245(0.9910)	-1.7062(0.9795)	0.6188(0.1000)	0.6245(0.0991)	-1.7063(0.9795)
9th policy month (j=9)	-3.2685(0.9210)	-3.2856(0.9230)	1.3186(0.9945)	-3.2685(0.9210)	-3.2856(0.9230)	1.3186(0.9945)
10th policy month (j=10)	-1.1110(0.0749)	-1.1000(0.0740)	-1.6054(0.9998)	-1.1110(0.0700)	-1.1090(0.0749)	0.1054(0.9998)
11th policy month (j=11)	-2.1177(0.9245)	-2.1098(0.9237)	0.1745(0.9994)	-2.1177(0.9245)	-2.1098(0.9237)	0.1745(0.9994)
12th policy month (j=12)	0.2080(0.7111)	0.4220(0.5140)	-2.5921(0.9466)	0.2080(0.7111)	0.4220(0.5104)	-2.5921(0.9466)



Table 7   Conditional correlation between theft insurance without typhoon/flood coverage and total theft claims during the four typhoon periods—estimated coefficients from regression (4’) 
	Est. oftypd*claim	Est. oftyphar*claim	Est. oftypd*typhar*claim	Est. of typd*typhar*claim*long
Typhoon_1	0.0075(0.2990)	0.0087(0.4300)	0.2312(<.0001)	-0.3417(<.0001)
Typhoon_2	0.0069(0. 3089)	0.0076(0.5696)	0.2879(<.0001)	-0.2911(0.0009)
Typhoon_3	0.0086(0.2013)	0.0092(0.3413)	0.4111(<.0001)	-0.4920(<.0001)
Typhoon_4	0.0078(0.2850)	0.0083(0.4974)	0.3976(<.0001)	-0.4031(0.0004)



Table 8   Conditional correlation between theft insurance without typhoon/flood coverage and partial theft claims during the four typhoon periods—estimated coefficients from regression (4’) 
	Est. oftypd*claim	Est. oftyphar*claim	Est. oftypd*typhar*claim	Est. of typd*typhar*claim*long
Typhoon_1	No claim filed in typhoon-affected regionbefore the typhoon hit
Typhoon_2	0.0033(0.7629)	0.0009(0.9211)	0.0059(0.4266)	-0.0026(0.3922)
Typhoon_3	0.0031(0.7922)	0.0011(0.8916)	0.0051(0.4823)	0.0009(0.9956)
Typhoon_4	0.0040(0.6902)	0.0004(0.9967)	0.0055(0.4400)	-0.0017(0.4700)





PAGE  



27



^1	  Since the 1980s, the emerging problem of fraud has attracted the attention of eight advanced nations, and the problem continues to prevail at present. Many studies have examined the issue of fraud, including the Insurance Research Council (1992, 1997), Fortin and Girard (1992), Artis et al. (1999), Dionne and Gagné (2001, 2002), Pao et al. (2012), and Dionne and Wang (2012). Many centralized associations have also been formed to try to find a solution to this problem, such as the International Association of Insurance Fraud Agencies, the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud in the US, the Comité Européen des Assurances for the European Union, and the Canadian Coalition Against Insurance Fraud (Derrig, 2002).
^2	  Dionne and Wang (2012) point out that external fraud is an important operational risk, which accounts for about 5% of the total claim value. Furthermore, this type of operational risk fluctuates in opposite directions to the business cycle. 
^3	  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) defines operational risk to include the risk resulting from the inadequacy of the failure process due to external events. External fraud is also one of the seven types of operational risk identified by SolvencyⅡ. Jarrow (2008) mentioned that the risk due to incentives, including fraud, is also one type of operational risk. Dahen and Dionne (2010) further pointed out that operational risk could be linked to people or external events.
^4	  Such (1985) and Boot and Thakor (1989) pointed out that multi-period contracts or contingent commitments can help to sort the borrowers based on quality. Sharpe (1990) inferred that contracts that took account of every contingency were too expensive and complicated, and that implicit commitments could also achieve the same purpose and extract rent from long-term customers.
^5	  The information regarding the history of the customers’ contracts with the insurance company extends from the year 2000 to the year 2008. Hence, for contracts sold in the year 2007, we trace the data back until the year 2000. As for the contracts sold in the year 2008, we trace them until the year 2001.
^6	  Dionne and Wang (2012) find evidence of fraud in Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance market: the replacement cost endorsement contract comparatively speaking faces a higher total theft claim rate near the end of the policy period than the contract with a depreciation design. Meanwhile, the no deductible contract faces a higher total theft claim rate at the beginning of the policy period than the contract with a deductible design. Pao, Tzeng and Wang (2012) also find evidence of fraud in Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance market in that the insured with theft insurance contracts are not also covered by the typhoon and flood insurance in spite of living in a typhoon region. Such insured have a higher tendency to file the total theft claim right after the typhoon hit than in the period before the typhoon hit, and in the regions other than the area where the typhoon hit.
^7	  In Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance contract, the “no deductible” endorsement cannot be chosen with a “replacement cost” endorsement at the same time. Hence, the contract with a replacement endorsement must be designed with a deductible, and the contract with no deductible endorsement must be designed with depreciation.
^8	  We also performed some sensitivity analysis for our later empirical tests. First, we varied the number of years of continuous contact from one year to seven years. The results indicate that the most significant outcome is when we define long-term customers as those insured with more than five years of continuous contact. Second, we also define the contact history based on the “total sum of contact years” instead of “continuous contact years”, and we vary the number of years. None of the results are as significant when we define long-term customers as those with “more than five years of continuous contact” with the insurance company.
^9	  We also find that all of the empirical results are robust even when we discard those young insured under 25 years old from our sample.
^10	  A total of 89.43% of insured are aged between 30 and 60. 89.98% of them are married and 64.5% of them are female. Such information relates to the registered vehicle owners.
^11	  The hit period and hit region for these four typhoons are listed in Table 4.
^12	  The period right after the typhoon hit refers to a period of one month after the typhoon hit. Hence, the counterpart period is the period before the typhoon hit, or more precisely the one-month period before the typhoon hit.
^13	  See Bourgeon and Picard (2012).
